The Confederate Nation: 1861 to 1865 by Emory M. Thomas

overestimated the size of Johnston’s army, underestimated the strength of the Federals, and made little allowance for the state of roads and railroads in northern Virginia. 23
    From his headquarters at Manassas, Beauregard took the rejection of his grand scheme as a personal affront and grumbled about the way Richmond was managing the war. Before he could fret too long, however, McDowell began his march, and Beauregard realized that his army was outnumbered and in peril. Frantically the General called for reinforcements. Davis responded by doing on a modest scale what Beauregard had originally proposed. The President ordered Johnston and Holmes to join Beauregard at Manassas. With 9,000 of Johnston’s troops and 3,000 of Holmes', Confederate numbers would roughly equal the Federals'. As a consequence Beauregard threw off his gloom and again began thinking about a battle of annihilation. 24
    On July 18 the Confederates repulsed a “reconnaissance in force” at Bull Run, and Beauregard’s confidence increased. McDowell’s march was cautious and his concentration at Centreville slow. On July 20, with the enemy still at Centreville and Holmes’ and Johnston’s troops pouring into his position, Beauregard determined to attack. 25
    Southern troop units were spread over an eight-mile front along Bull Run. Oddly, the largest numbers occupied the most defensible terrain, steeply wooded slopes that lay across the most direct route between Centreville and Manassas. Beauregard’s headquarters were nearby at the home of Wilbur McLean, a local farmer. West of McLean’s farm the banks of Bull Run leveled out and the countryside was open and rolling. Bull Run was fordable in several places along the Southern line, but the only bridge in the vicinity was at the extreme left of the Confederate position. Over the entire western, or left, half of his position, Beauregard had stationed only a brigade and a half of troops, comprising six regiments, or roughly 5,000 men. This imbalanced troop distribution, especially as related to terrain, did not trouble Beauregard on July 20, however; he was preparing his attack orders and cared little for considerations relating primarily to defense. 26
    When Johnston arrived with the van of his army on the Manassas Gap Railroad, he solved two of Beauregard’s problems. Johnston assured Beauregard that the reinforcements from the valley would be present and ready for action on July 21. He also agreed with Beauregard that the Confederates must attack as soon as possible. And even though he outranked Beauregard, Johnston agreed to let Beauregard plan and execute the battle. This seemed logical since Beauregard was more familiar with the local situation. 27
    Accordingly, the Hero of Sumter retired to his room on the evening of July 20 to construct his attack order. The document he produced is a model of military obfuscation. The over-all concept was fine: the Southern army was supposed to converge upon Centreville from three directions and crush the enemy. But when Beauregard tried to fill in the details, his mind miscarried. His instructions were confusing at best; he wrote of “divisions and corps,” which did not exist in his army, an amalgam of brigades. Beauregard’s staff completed the necessary copies of the order at 4:30 a.m . on July 21 and awakened Johnston to sign them. The General was not so sleepy that he overlooked Beauregard’s errors; but he signed the document anyway in hopes that the attack would take place at dawn and that Beauregard had a firmer grasp of the situation than his orders indicated. 28
    Fortunately for the Confederates, they never had to execute Beauregard’s order. A Federal artillery shell crashed into the McLean kitchen while messengers were still trying to distribute the order. The shell interrupted Beauregard’s breakfast and his attack. McDowell’s army was on the march. The Federals first feinted at the stone bridge on the far left of the Southern line, then