The Venetians: A New History: from Marco Polo to Casanova by Paul Strathern

direct attack on Venice from the sea, much as Paganino Doria had done in the previous war, only this time they would bring the full might of their fleet. Consequently Pisani was ordered to use his fleet to protect the Adriatic and its approaches against any direct Genoese threat, whilst Zeno was given a more general brief to patrol the Mediterranean, attacking Genoese colonies and any enemy convoys that he came across on the trade routes.
    The extent to which Venice remained economically and militarily depleted can be seen from the fact that Pisani had command of just fourteen galleys, and even these were undermanned. The loss of Dalmatia had cut off not only an important source of grain, but also a recruiting ground for galley oarsmen. Several of Pisani’s galleys were manned by Cretans, and a few were even reduced to skeleton crews, with just one man to some oarsmen’s benches. As a result, these galleys were almost totally reliant upon sails for propulsion, and could not manoeuvre at close quarters – the one great military advantage of rowed galleys.
    The first serious naval encounter of the war took place in late May 1378, when Pisani spotted a convoy of ten Genoese galleys moving down the south-western coast of Italy near the mouth of the Tiber. Pisani set off in pursuit, catching up with the Genoese off the cape at Anzio on 30 May. By this stage a storm had blown up, with heavy seas and darkened skies, but Pisani ordered his galleys to attack nonetheless. As a result of the weather, and undermanning, four of Pisani’s galleys were unable to engage with the enemy, and while the others closed in on the Genoese, grappling proved extremely hazardous. Despite this, only four of the Genoese galleys managed to escape, one was driven onto the rocks and the other five were captured, together with the Genoese commander, Luigi de’ Fieschi. *
    Pisani had hardly won a great naval victory, but its effect would prove as such. At the time the citizens of Genoa were much in need of reassurance with regard to this latest war with Venice. Encouraged by Venice, Genoa’s neighbour, Francesco, Marchese dal Carretto, had risen up and seized Albenga just forty miles west along the coast, laying waste to Genoese territory in the process. Now, with Genoa’s naval defences down to a minimum, came news of a threatening Venetian victory, quickly followed by rumours that the enemy fleet was assembling in the Bay of Spezia, just over a day’s sailing distance to the east. Overcome with fear, the population of Genoa rose up on 17 June and stormed the palace of the aged, long-serving doge, Domenico di Campofregoso, causing him to be deposed. When order was restored, the younger and more popular Niccolò Guarco was elected in his place.
    In fact, the victorious but undermanned Venetian galleys were nowhere near Spezia. Pisani realised that he had insufficient strength to take Genoa, no matter how ill-defended it might have been. Instead, he sailed east to keep a rendezvous off the south-western Peloponnese with six galleys from Crete. After a fruitless search for Genoese shipping he set off back for theAdriatic, where he attacked the strategic Hungarian-held ports of Cattaro (modern Kotor) and Sebenico (Šibenik), returning them to Venetian control. He then set sail for Venice, intending to winter his ships in the lagoon, where they could be refurbished at the Arsenale, and many of the sailors could spend some well-earned time with their families.
    To Pisani’s surprise, his request to enter Venice was denied by the authorities. He was instead expected to winter almost 100 miles to the south at Pola, in readiness to escort and protect an expected convoy of grain ships from Apulia in the heel of Italy. This decision by the Venetian authorities has been called ‘a serious error of judgement’, resulting as it did in an unnecessary collapse of morale amongst the crews, who would spend the winter in damp, cramped conditions aboard ship, rather